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SUMMARY OF REPLY 
As the Sharps admit at page 12 of their Brief, this case is 
"very simple". Notwithstanding that admitted simplicity, the 
Sharps have, in that same brief, made every effort to obfuscate 
and confuse the issues before this Court, 
In this Reply Brief, Appellants will, using the same 
organization appearing in the Sharps1 Brief, demonstrate that the 
trial court's decision was erroneous as a matter of law and, in 
critical respects, unsupported by any competent evidence in the 
record. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE SHARPS HAD A DUTY TO RECONVEY LOTS 
IRRESPECTIVE OF ANY REQUEST BY APPELLANTS 
The trial court concluded, as a matter of law: "Plaintiffs 
were obligated, under the terms of the Memorandum of Closing 
Terms (the "Memorandum") and pursuant to their own practice, to 
specifically request and identify lots, including Lot 6, for 
release by the Sharps." (C. 11 7, Add. 39.) In this regard, the 
trial court specifically found that the Memorandum provides "for 
the release by the Sharps of 'PUD lots' only" (F. 59, Add. 27 
(emphasis added)). Accordingly, the trial court found that, 
under all relevant documents, Appellants were entitled only to 
platted Lots. 
•^Appellants will use the same abbreviations as in their 
initial brief. Unless otherwise indicated, all "Add." citations 
refer to pages of the addendum to Appellantsf initial Brief. 
2Appellants dispute the legal correctness of this finding 
with respect to their claim to the 7.35 acres. (See discussion 
regarding Leisure at pp. 4 and 5 infra). 
The Memorandum is explicit and unambiguous. No party has 
ever suggested otherwise. Even if ambiguous, howeverf all 
ambiguity must be construed against the Sharps since it was 
drafted by their representative (TR. 30-31). See, e.g., Sears v. 
Riemersma, 655 P. 2d 1105f 1007 (Utah 1982). The Memorandum 
provides, in part: 
after recordation of the PUD Plat and the Declaration of 
Covenants/ Conditions and Restrictions, and upon receipt 
of each $140,000 in principal . . . Seller [Sharps] 
shall execute and deliver to Buyer [Appellants] a 
Partial Deed of Reconveyance for one (1) PUD lot. 
(F. 11 15 Add. 14-15; Ex. D-15 11 1, Add. 71 (emphasis added); TR. 
41-42.). The Memorandum also provides: 
Upon the payment of the release price, Buyer 
[Appellants] shall be entitled to the release of one (1) 
lot of Buyer's choice upon receipt of the payment or at 
any time thereafter. 
(F. 11 16, Add. 15; ex. D-15 11 2, Add. 71 (emphasis added)). 
The Memorandum continues: 
Upon the recordation of the PUD Plat and Declaration of 
Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions with the Summit 
County Recorder, Buyer [Appellants] shall be entitled to 
the release from the Deed of Trust of three (3) PUD lots 
of Buyer's choice together with the said roadway. 
(F. II 17, Add. 15; Ex. D-15 1[ 3, Add. 71 (emphasis added); 
TR. 46, 89-90, 352-53). 
It is undisputed that by December 23, 1983, Appellants had 
satisfied all conditions in the Memorandum and paid sufficient 
principal to entitle them to the release of five (5) lots and the 
^The trial court did find 11 7 of the Memorandum to be 
ambiguous (C. 16, Add. 42). To the extent the Sharps suggest, in 
footnote 2 of their Brief, that any other portion of the 
Memorandum was found ambiguous, they are wrong. 
Roadway. (Ex. D-7, Add. 67-70; Ex. P-51, Add. 91-125 and Ex. 
P-53; Reply Add. 39; TR. 90-91; 96; 322-23.) By June 30, 1984, 
Appellants had paid additional principal entitling them to the 
release of a sixth lot. (Ex. P-53, Reply Add. 39; TR. 49-50; 
95-96.) The Sharps admit Appellants initially selected, and by 
November 18, 1983 communicated to Jon Heaton their formal request 
for, Lots 1-5. (Sharps1 Brief at p. 22.) 
Under the Memorandum, then, Appellants were entitled to 
platted lots and the Roadway. On June 30, 1984, there was only 
one platted Lot and the Roadway left to be reconveyed. The 
Memorandum is explicit, unambiguous and self-executing: on June 
30, 1984, the Sharps were absolutely required to "execute and 
deliver to Appellants a Partial Deed of Reconveyance for one (1) 
PUD lot." There was only one PUD lot available for Appellants on 
June 30, 1984 — Lot 6 — and Appellants became absolutely 
entitled to Lot 6 on that date by the explicit and self-executing 
terms of the Memorandum. 
In defense of the trial court's conclusion that a request 
for lots was necessary, the Sharps rely exclusively on the fact 
that the lots to be released were to be of Appellants1 choice. 
They argue that without Appellants1 making that "choice", no 
obligation to release arose. Irrespective of Appellants1 right 
to choose which lots were to be released, the Sharps were 
irrevocably obligated to release lots, whether they be Lots 1-6 
qThe Sharps deny Appellants were entitled to reconveyance of 
the Roadway, but nowhere deny Appellants made all payments 
required under 11 3 of the Memorandum. 
or 7-12. Seef Leisure Campground & Country Club Ltd. Pship. v. 
Leisure Estates, 280 Md. 220, 372 A.2d 595 (App. 1977). 
In Leisure, the court considered whether a mortgagor's right 
to secure the release of forty acres from a larger tract lapsed 
upon its default. Despite the mortgagor's failure to identify 
specifically the forty acres it wanted released, the court 
concluded that the lack of specificity was not fatal. It also 
refused to excuse the mortgagee's express obligation to release 
the real property: 
While it is certain the parties could have been more 
explicit, we believe the language of the release clause 
here - viewed in light of the fact that the mortgage was 
executed for the purpose of facilitating a land 
development venture to be undertaken exclusively by the 
mortgagor - clearly and unambiguously entitles the 
mortgagor to request and have released forty acres of 
its choice. Under these circumstances, it is 
inconceivable to us that, if the mortgagee or some third 
party was meant to have any control as to which parcel 
of land was to be selected for release, there would be 
no additional words intimating that intention. 
Id. at 600. The right to make a choice belonged to Appellants, 
not the Sharps, and Appellants' choice was a mere formality to 
the release of property, which was not extinguished by 
Appellants' default. 
To the extent the Sharps argued, and the trial court found, 
that by requesting lots 1-5, Appellants had created a "practice", 
the trial court and the Sharps are simply wrong as a matter of 
law. A "practice" is a custom or usage, something habitually and 
uniformly performed, and it implies uniformity and continuity. 
See, Phillips v. City of Bend, 192 Or. 143, 234 P.2d 572, 577 
(1951) (en banc). "Habitual" means constant, customary, 
accustomed, usual, common, ordinary or done so often and 
repeatedly as to form a habit, but does not include single or 
occasional acts* See, People Ex. Rel. Elliott v. Interstate 
Motor Freight Sys., 17 Ill.App. 2d 547, 150 N.E.2d 879, 881 
(1958). 
The trial court's finding — and the Sharps1 argument — 
that Appellants' single November, 1983 designation of Lots 1-5 
constituted a "practice" is therefore a legal impossibility.5 Of 
necessity, Appellants had to designate Lots 1-5, or some other 
combination of five lots, because there were six platted Lots. 
After the November, 1983 designation of Lots 1-5, however, there 
was no choice of platted lots left to make; only one platted lot 
remained. Accordingly, pursuant to the unequivocal language of 
the Memorandum, Appellants automatically became entitled to Lot 6 
on June 30, 1984, and no request was necessary to trigger the 
Sharps' duty to reconvey. 
DIn support of their claim that "requests" are necessary, 
Sharps identify various facts, none of which support the trial 
court's conclusion. In Point I of Sharps1 Brief, subpoints (a) 
and (b) refer to the terms of the Memorandum and not toward any 
practice of Appellants. Subpoints (c) through (g) fail to 
identify a single event that may be remotely considered a 
"request" . 
6At footnote 12 of Sharps' Brief, they argue that had 
Appellants platted the southern portion, more than just lot 6 
would have been available for release to Appellants. As a matter 
of law, Appellants are entitled to the release of property 
regardless of whether a choice was made. See Leisure, 372 A.2d at 
600. This is true even if platting did not occur until after 
default. See Burroughs v. Garner, 43 M.D.App. 302, 405 A.2d 301, 
308-09 (1979). 
POINT II 
THE SHARPS MATERIALLY BREACHED THE CONTRACT 
LONG BEFORE ANY ALLEGED BREACH BY APPELLANTS 
Contrary to the trial court's conclusion that Appellants' 
refusal to pay taxes preceded any default by the Sharps, the 
following chronology demonstrates that the Sharps breached the 
Memorandum before any alleged breach by Appellants: 
November 18, 1983. Jon Heaton wrote to his clientf John C. 
Sharp, that Appellants would seek the release of Lots 1-5, along 
with the Roadway. In that same letter, Heaton advised his client 
that his review indicated Appellants were entitled to those Lots 
and to the Roadway. (Ex. D-25, Add. 85.)7 
December 23, 1983. The plat and CCRs were filed with the 
Summit County Recorder. (F. 11 40, Add. 22; Ex. D-l, Add. 59; 
Ex. P-51, Add. 91-131; TR. 90-91.) Six lots and the Roadway were 
described therein. (Ex. D-l, Add. 59.) At that point, 
Appellants became entitled to five Lots and the Roadway. (Ex. 
D-15 1111 1, 3, Add. 71. ) 
January 20, 1984. Felton wrote the Sharps1 attorney, 
Heaton, demanding the deed to Lots 1-5 and to the Roadway. (Ex. 
D-30, Add. 89). 
June 30, 1984. Appellants had paid additional principal 
entitling them to the release of the only remaining lot, Lot 6. 
(Ex. P-44, Reply Add. 1-13; P-53, Reply Add. 39.) 
'As pointed out at footnote 16, infra, the Sharps1 
suggestion that Heaton wrote his November 18, 1983 letter to John 
C. Sharp as White Pine Ranches' agent, is mistaken. 
The Memorandum specifically required that the Sharps provide 
Appellants with a Partial Deed of Reconveyance for each $140,000 
in principal. (F. 11 15, Add. 14-15; Ex. D-15, 11 1, Add. 71; TR. 
41-42.) It is undisputed that the deed of partial reconveyance 
for Lots 1-5 was not prepared until January 7, 1986, and was not 
recorded until March 28, 1986. (F. 1( 43, Add. 23; Ex. P-45, Add. 
90; TR. 68-70.) 
This delay by the Sharps1 unequivocally violated the 
Memorandum's requirement that the Sharps "shall execute and 
deliver to Buyer a Partial Deed of Reconveyance" upon their 
"receipt of each $140,000 in principal" (Ex. D-15 1M[ 1 and 2, 
Add. 71 (emphasis added)). The Sharps have never prepared a 
release of the Roadway. (TR. 46). Finally, as pointed out in 
Point I, supra, Appellants became vested with the right to Lot 6, 
the only remaining platted lot, on June 30, 1984. Again, it is 
undisputed that no Partial Deed of Reconveyance was ever executed 
for Lot 6. 
By the time the November 1984 taxes became due, the Sharps 
had therefore breached their obligations at least three different 
times when they (1) failed to execute and deliver a Partial Deed 
of Reconveyance for Lots 1-5; (2) failed to release the Roadway; 
and (3) failed to execute and deliver a Partial Deed of 
Reconveyance for Lot 6. Accordingly, the Sharps' argument and 
the trial court's conclusion that Appellants' failure to pay real 
estate taxes constituted the first material default totally 
ignores the legal issues involved in this lawsuit. 
As pointed out at pages 14-29 of Appellants' Brief, the 
Sharps' refusal to execute and deliver the foregoing partial 
deeds of reconveyance constituted material breaches of the 
Contract and excused any further performance by Appellants. 
Appellants were legally justified in, and excused from, any 
further performance under the Contract until the Sharps remedied 
the three foregoing material defaults. See, McCarren v. Merrill, 
15 Utah 2d 179, 389 P.2d 732, 733 (1964). 
Moreover, even iJE this Court accepts the trial court's 
conclusion that Appellants were the first to default by reason of 
their non-payment of the November 1984 property taxes, that 
default still did not excuse or extinguish the Sharps' obligation 
to reconvey property upon the Sharps1 timely receipt of specified 
sums required by the Memorandum. See, Columbia Dev., Inc. v. 
Watchie, 252 Or. 81, 448 P.2d 360 (1968); Leisure 372 A.2d at 
599. In this regard, the Sharps have failed either to 
distinguish the authorities relied on by Appellants at pages 
25-32 of Appellants' Brief, or to provide any persuasive legal 
authority for the trial court's conclusion that the failure to 
pay real estate taxes is a material default which precludes a 
release of lots from a mortgage. 
In an attempt to buttress the trial court's untenable 
conclusion, the Sharps cite a number of cases for the legal 
proposition that the Appellants' failure to pay taxes was a 
material breach and precluded Appellants from demanding the 
release of property while in default. The Sharps' own cases, 
however, demonstrate that the Sharps remained obligated to 
reconvey Lot 6, the Roadway and 7.35 unplatted acres 
(collectively, the "Unreleased Property") even if demand was made 
after default. Accordingly, Appell-ants are entitled to these 
releases because (1) release payments preceded any failure to pay 
taxes; and (2) Appellants1 demand for release, even if made after 
default, came before foreclosure. 
The Sharps' two main cases, City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. 
Heckmann, 164 Misc. 234, 299 N.Y.S. 592 (Sup.Ct. 1937) and 
Clason's Point Land Co. v. Schwartz, 237 App.Div. 741, 262 N.Y.S. 
756 (App.Div. 1933), addressed whether a mortgagor was entitled 
to the release of property even though he was in default at the 
time demand was made. Neither of these cases stands for the 
proposition urged by the Sharps because in both cases the 
mortgagor failed to make payments for release of property until 
after taxes became due. See, Farmers Trust, 297 N.Y.S. at 594 
(mortgagor tendered cash for release of property sixty days after 
taxes had been due); Clason's Point, 262 N.Y.S. at 758-59 (when 
"release payment" was made, mortgagor was already in default for 
non-payment of taxes). The post-default nature of the payments 
was central to the courts1 decisions and formed the basis for 
their holdings. 
In contrast, Appellants made payments to Respondents on 
July 16, 1981, June 30, 1982, June 30 and November 21, 1983 and 
°The Leisure court went one step further and held that even 
after foreclosure, the parties1 release obligation was* not 
excused: 
The mortgagor's default in this case did not extinguish 
its release right inasmuch as full payment was made 
prior to default, and there is nothing in the instrument 
indicating that the parties intended the right [to 
release] to be divested upon default or foreclosure. 
372 A.2d at 599. 
June 30, 1984 totaling $1,486,691.45.y These payments entitled 
Appellants to the release of Lots 1-5 and the Unreleased 
Propertyc All of these payments, except Felton's June 30, 1985 
payment, preceded Appellants' non-payment of 1984 taxes. Where 
release payments are made before the due date for the payment of 
taxes, the defaulting party is entitled to judgment for specific 
performance of the covenant to release. See, Farmers Trust, 297 
N.YoS. at 595; Clason's Point, 262 N.Y.S. at 758-59. 
In further support of their claim that Appellants' refusal 
to pay taxes precludes them from obtaining releases, the Sharps 
rely on Markowitz v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 651 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 
1981). Although that court held that the debtor's failure to pay 
taxes for 1972, 1973 and 1974 precluded the debtor from demanding 
release of property, two. significant facts led to the court's 
decision. First, the debtor's offer to pay the release payment 
came in 1973, after the 1972 taxes had become due. Second, the 
terms of the mortgage prohibited the debtor from receiving the 
release so long as he was in default. Id. at 826-27. 
In contrast, all payments to the Sharps entitling Appellants 
to release of property were made prior to Appellants' refusal to 
pay taxes. (Exs. P-44, Reply Add. 1-13; P-53, Reply Add. 39). 
Moreover, the Memorandum requires the unconditional release of 
property upon payment of the release price (June 30, 1984) or "at 
any time thereafter." (Ex. D-15 1[ 2; Add. 71). Unlike 
Markowitz, there is no contractual requirement which precluded 
^Felton made an additional payment to Sharps on June 30, 
1985 of $59,709.47, which Sharps accepted and retained. (Ex. 
P-44, Reply Add. 2, TR. 54-55). 
Appellants from demanding release of property even after 
default. Cf., Leisure, 372 A. 2d at 599 (requirement that demand 
be made before default is inapplicable where the release clause 
anticipates that demand will be made at a later date). 
Las Vegas Ranch Club v. Bank of Nevada, 97 Nev. 384, 632 
P.2d 1146 (1981), is equally distinguishable. The Sharps rely on 
Ranch Club for the proposition that if a trustor is in default at 
the time he requests reconveyance, the beneficiary is not 
obligated to reconvey. The release provision at issue in Ranch 
Club, however, contained three conditions which did not exist in 
this Contract. ° Due to these significant factual distinctions, 
Ranch Club does not provide authority for the proposition that 
Appellants1 subsequent default extinguished their paid-for and 
vested rights.11 
A synthesis of the cases relied on by the Sharps reveals a 
single unifying principle compelling the relief sought by 
Appellants — if release payments are made prior to a default in 
the payment of taxes, the defaulting party remains entitled to 
the release of property even after default unless the contract 
luThe trust deed in Ranch Club required the satisfaction of 
three conditions: "First, the trustor must provide a written 
request for each reconveyance. Second, the annual payment must 
accompany that request. And third, the trustor must not be in 
default on any covenant contained in either the promissory note 
or in the deed of trust." Ranch Club, 632 P.2d at 1147 (emphasis 
added). 
•'--'-Respondents' reliance on Sharp v. Brock, 626 S.W. 2d 166 
(Tex.App. 1981) is equally distinguishable because the debtor 
there never made a demand for release of property until after the 
property had been foreclosed and a deficiency action commenced. 
Appellants1 demand for release of property occurred long before 
foreclosure. In fact, no foreclosure has taken place. 
provides otherwise. This is the same result compelled by Watchie 
and Leisure, which appropriately extended the principle to 
require releases even if payment is made after default. See 
Watchie, 448 P.2d 360; Leisure, 372 A.2d at 599. The remedy 
Appellants sought in this case includes the release of Lot 6, the 
Roadway and 5.35 acres, all of which Appellants paid for before 
their refusal to pay taxes, and the release of an additional 2.0 
acres, for which Felton paid on June 30, 1985. (Ex. P-53, Reply 
Add. 39). 
At footnote 20 of the Sharps1 Brief, they assert that the 
Watchie, Burroughs and Eldridge cases are distinguishable. 
First/ the Sharps contend Watchie is distinguishable because the 
court found the plaintiff was not prejudiced by the releases 
because there was ample security after release. Contrary to the 
Sharps1 assertion, the remaining property, had the Sharps made 
timely releases, would have provided adequate security. LeRoy 
Pia, the only witness to testify as to property values, stated 
that as of January 4, 1984 the property had a value of $37,500 
per acre and that as late as January 1, 1988, the value was 
$25,000 per acre. (Ex. P-97). Had the Sharps timely released 
the Unreleased Property, 20.2705 acres would have remained 
subject to the Trust Deed. Even at the lower $25,000 figure, the 
Sharps were secured by property valued at $506,762.50, an amount 
far exceeding the outstanding principal balance on June 30, 
1984.12 
12As of June 30, 1984, there was an outstanding principal 
balance owing of $385,222.12. (Ex. D-122). The trial court 
incorrectly found the fair market value to be $20,000 per acre. 
There is no evidence in the trial record to support this finding, 
(Fn Conft Next Page) 
Next, the Sharps seek to distinguish Burroughs on the basis 
that the parties in Burroughs waived platting requirements, while 
arguing Appellants were required to plat before releases would be 
accomplished. The Sharps1 reading of Burroughs, however, is in 
error. The court, when discussing the platting requirement said: 
We are not unmindful that appellants, in an effort to 
avoid the impact of Leisure, contend that recordation of 
a subdivision plat and payment in full of the entire 
indebtedness upon default, preclude release after 
default in this case. Their position cannot be 
sustained. The requirement of recordation of a plat, 
which applies only to the 25 acres, is a condition 
precedent to the execution of a release by the 
trustees. Again, the provision requiring payment in 
full of the entire indebtedness upon default is standard 
and was undoubtedly present in Leisure; it has no 
bearing upon the mortgagors1 right to request a release 
for which full payment was made prior to default. 
Burroughs, 405 A.2d at 308-309. In this case, the requirement of 
platting, at most, was a condition precedent to the execution of 
a release, which condition could occur before or after default. 
It is undisputed that Appellants platted half of the property 
prior to any default. (Ex. 1, Add. 59). It is also undisputed 
that Felton offered to plat the remaining property if Sharps 
would make the appropriate releases. (TR. 138, 202). 
Consequently, Burroughs applies, and Appellants1 non-platting of 
the southern portion of the property has no bearing on 
Appellants1 right to choose the lot or lots to be released for 
which they made full payment prior to default. 
Finally, the Sharps argue that Eldridge does not apply 
because the court only held that the buyer was entitled to 
which is contrary to Pia's trial testimony. (Ex. P-97; 
TR. 472-73). The property, even if valued at $20,000 per acre, 
would have had a value of $405,410.00, still enough to secure the 
Sharps fully. 
releases which accrued prior to default. The same is true with 
respect to Appellants. The trial court erred by denying 
Appellants1 claim for specific performance and the release of the 
Unreleased Property, all of which they had paid for before 
default. 
Accordingly, this court should follow Watchie, Burroughs, 
Leisure and Eldridge, reverse the trial court's decision, and 
rule (1) that Appellants had a vested right to the release of the 
Unreleased Property under the Contract even after Appellants1 
failure to pay taxes; and (2) that Respondents1 failure to 
release that Unreleased Property was a material breach. 
POINT III 
THE PARTIES' ORIGINAL CONTRACT WAS NOT MODIFIED; 
THE CONSENT TO RECORD IN NO WAY RELEASED THE 
ROADWAY AS REQUIRED BY THE MEMORANDUM 
The Sharps argue that their execution of the Consent to 
Record (the "Consent") constituted a modification of the 
Memorandum. Appellants demonstrate the error of this argument at 
pages 42-45 of their brief. Additionally, such purported 
modification must be supported by some new consideration. See, 
Cheney v. Rucker, 14 Utah 2d 205, 381 P.2d 86, 89 (Utah 1963). 
Although alluding to the existence of such new consideration, the 
Sharps fail to identify it. 
The Memorandum specifically required the Sharps, subject 
only to their "reasonable approval", to execute the Consent. (F. 
18, Add. 15-16). By signing the Consent, the Sharps did nothing 
they were not already required to do, and their performance of a 
required action does not provide new consideration sufficient to 
-support the alleged modification. See, e.g., Southeastern 
Equipment Co, v. Mauss, 696 P.2d 1187 (Utah 1985); Baggs v, 
Anderson, 528 P.2d 141, 143 (Utah 1974). 
Furthermore, the Sharps simply misstate the record when they 
claim, at page 27 of their Brief, that "the parties clearly 
modified the Contract by agreeing, through the negotiations and 
correspondence (including a letter (ex. 31) signed by a general 
partner of White Pine Ranches) preceding the execution of the 
Consent to Record, that the Sharps would retain access in 
consideration of their Consent." 
That single quotation by the Sharps contains three factual 
misstatements. First, the vested interest in the Roadway 
belonged to the individuals who signed the Trust Deed, the Trust 
Deed Note, and the Memorandum, or to their successors and 
assigns. White Pine Ranches, a partnership, had no ownership 
interest whatsoever in the Roadway or the Contract; its sole 
interest was in Lots 2 and 5. (Exs. D-2, D-3, Add. 60-65; D-15, 
Add. 71-74; Ex. P-46, Reply Add. 14-38). Accordingly, any 
purported negotiation by one of those individuals, without the 
express written consent of the others, was ineffective to bind 
the other individual owners. See, Williams v. Singleton, 723 
P.2d 421, 423 (Utah 1986). Second, Exhibit 31, relied on by the 
Sharps, is dated September 24, 1985, nearly two years after the 
Sharps executed the Consent. Finally, not one of the individuals 
purchasing the Roadway from the Sharps signed anything granting 
an easement to the Sharps, either before or after the Sharps' 
November 23, 1983 execution of the Consent. Any purported 
easement must satisfy the Utah Statue of Frauds. Cf. Flying 
Diamond Oil Corp. v. Newton Sheep Co., 776 P.2d 618, 629 (Utah 
1989) (interests in land, including covenants, must be in 
writing). 
Next, the Sharps argue their execution of the Consent 
constituted a release of the Roadway. The cases cited by the 
Sharps all deal with the release of claims, not with the release 
of property. In a property context, however, the word "release" 
is technical, and passes any interest in the property which the 
releasor may have. See, Jackson, ex dem. Bond v. Root, 18 Johns. 
60, 68, 71, 79 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. 1820); Richardson v. Levi, 67 Tex. 
359, 3 S.W. 444, 448 (Tx. 1887). Similarly, a "release" of real 
property consists of an out of possession party's conveyance of 
his rights to the party in possession. See, Baker v. Woodward, 12 
Or. 3, 6 P. 173, 178 (1885) overruled on other grounds, 245 P. 
724 (1926); Trustee Co. v. Bresnahan, 119 Colo. 311, 203 P.2d 
499, 501 (1949) ("release is a remission or giving up, or 
surrendering of some vested right or claim). 
The Sharps never created or executed a legally sufficient 
release of the Roadway.13 To the contrary, the Sharps 
specifically instructed Associated Title to ensure that the 
Roadway remain subject to the Trust Deed (Ex. D-28, Add. 88). 
Moreover, when questioned about whether the Roadway had been 
released, John C. Sharp adamantly insisted that the Sharps would 
not release the Roadway until the trust deed was paid in full. 
1JAt page 28 of their Brief, the Sharps suggest that the 
concept of "reconveyance" as opposed to "release" was never 
argued before the trial court. This is utter nonsense. Not only 
did the Complaint allege that the Sharps violated Utah Code Ann. 
§ 57-1-33, this very issue was argued at length at trial (TR. 
762-87) and ruled on by the trial court. (C. 23 and 24, Add. 
43) . 
(TR. 45). q There simply is no way the Sharps can twist the 
English language to suggest that such a retention constitutes the 
relinquishment of all their interest in the Roadway as required 
by a "release". 5 
The untenability of the Sharps' "retention equals release 
equals reconveyance" logic is highlighted by the fact that they 
requested an easement in the first place. If the Sharps needed 
an easement, it was because Appellants were entitled to the 
Roadway and unwilling to proceed without its reconveyance. 
Otherwise/ there would be no need for the Sharps1 claimed 
easement. When this point is borne in mind, it becomes obvious 
the Sharps acknowledged and understood the Appellants were 
entitled to fee ownership of the Roadway — not merely access or 
x
^The Sharps' obdurate refusal to release the Roadway is 
clear from Jon Heaton's July 1, 1986 letter, where he informs his 
client, John Sharp: 
You will recall there has been a lot of pressure to 
release the road. I have refused so to do because 
of your need of it for access . . . . 
(Ex. P-131, Add. 134-35). Moreover, the court itself recognized 
at trial that the Sharps had not released the Roadway: 
Counsel, I don't recall there being a dispute that 
the roadway hasn't been released. 
(TR, 456 (emphasis added)). 
15Similarly, the Sharps seem to argue that the Appellants' 
execution of the CCRs constitutes the release of the Roadway 
required by 1[ 3 of the Memorandum. The Sharps failed to explain, 
however, how a document executed by the Appellants can constitute 
the release which the Sharps were required to make. Finally, the 
Sharps' continuing attempts to foreclose the Roadway and 
assertion that because of Appellants' default they were excused 
from executing releases, are totally inconsistent with their 
argument that they ever "released" the Roadway to Appellants. 
use rights — and the Sharps wrongfully refused to release that 
vested interest. 
The Sharps1 attorney, John Heaton ("Heaton"), determined 
that Appellants were entitled to Lots 1-5 along with the Roadway 
(Ex. D-25, Add. 85; Ex. 131, Add. 134-35).16 Heaton therefore 
treated the release requirements of Lots 1-5 and the Roadway 
identically. Heaton prepared all closing documents, including 
the Memorandum. (TR. 30-31). Since 11 1 of the Memorandum 
specifically required Partial Deeds of Reconveyance, and Heaton 
stated in his November 18, 1983 letter that all five Lots, plus 
the Roadway, were to be treated the same, the Sharps cannot 
seriously argue at this point that they could fulfill their 
ldAt pages 9 and 22 of their Brief, among others, the Sharps 
ask this Court to believe that Heatonfs November 18, 1983 letter 
was written by Appellants1 attorney. An examination of Exhibit 
25 demonstrates that Heaton represented the Sharps in connection 
with its preparation. For example, referring to Appellant 
Saunders1 request for reconveyance, Heaton wrote: "We will 
handle that matter when it is presented [by Saunders]. For your 
information, I have reviewed the payments under the Note and find 
that he [Saunders] is entitled to those releases. When those 
releases are made, pursuant to your instruction we will ensure 
that rights are reserved in White Pine Lane for access to the 
southern portion of the property purchased from you until your 
Deed of Trust is fully paid." (Ex. 25, Add. 85), A lawyer can 
hardly accept "instructions" from someone not his client. Any 
doubt concerning whom Heaton was representing in that 
November 18, 1983 letter was laid to rest by the November 21, 
1983 letter of Robert Felton to Heaton: "Please have your client 
sign his consent to the recordation immediately since time is 
very crucial to our construction financing." (Ex. D-26, Add. 69-
70 (emphasis added)). Felton therefore made clear that in 
November, 1983 Heaton represented the Sharps, not Appellants. It 
is inconceivable that a party can be represented by a lawyer in a 
matter and not know that lawyer is representing him. The Sharps 
have simply misrepresented Heatonfs role in this whole matter by 
their attempt to have this Court believe that Heaton wrote his 
November 18, 1983 letter (Ex. D-25) on behalf of anyone other 
than Sharps. 
contractual requirements with anything less than deeds of 
reconveyance. 
POINT IV 
APPELLANTS DID NOT GRANT AN EASEMENT 
OVER THE ROADWAY TO THE SHARPS 
At pages 38-44 of their initial Brieff Appellants list the 
various reasons why an easement over the Roadway was never 
created. In Point IV of their Brief, the Sharps do not attempt 
to refute a single case relied on by Appellants. Instead, the 
Sharps merely argue that Felton's unilateral acts somehow created 
an easement. 
As demonstrated in Point III, supra, however, White Pine 
Ranches had no interest in the Roadway, and such an easement 
could be created only with the written consent of all Individual 
Appellants. No such written grant was ever made. Moreover, as 
demonstrated in footnote 16, supra, Heaton was representing the 
Sharps, not the Appellants; and as such Heaton was incapable of 
binding or making any representations on behalf of Appellants to 
the Sharps. 
The Sharps argue that inclusion of the Consent in the CCRs 
somehow binds Appellants to something. The Sharps nowhere, 
however, explain why this should be so. The Consent pertains 
only to lots in Phase I; Phase I pertains only to Lots 1-6, plus 
the Roadway, and the trial court found that not a single lot in 
Phase I (Lots 1-6) has ever been sold (F. 73, Add. 30). In such 
a situation, M[w]here the owner of a tract files a plat or a 
declaration of restrictions that imposes covenants on the tract, 
the owner retains the right to amend those covenants at least 
until the first lot is sold from the tract." 5 R. Powell, The 
Law of Real Property, 11 677 at 60-118 (1988). Accordingly, it is 
clear as a matter of law that the CCRs were a unilateral act by 
Appellants which they are free to change even today, until 
someone purchases one of the Lots in Phase I. 
Furthermore, the Sharps1 argument that the CCRs creates an 
easement by estoppel is legally insupportable. The Sharps' own 
case, Freightways Terminal Co. v. Industrial & Commercial 
Constr., Inc., 381 P.2d 977 (Alaska 1963), makes clear that an 
easement by estoppel is impossible in the circumstances of this 
case. Such an easement requires (1) an attempted oral grant of 
an easement, followed by (2) improvements by the intended grantee 
for the purpose of exercising the easement. See, Id. at 984. In 
the absence of such an oral grant, there can be no easement by 
estoppel. See, Hawkins v. Alaska Freight Lines, Inc., 410 P. 2d 
992, 993 (Alaska 1966). The two Utah cases relied on by the 
Sharps, Lyman Grazing Ass'n. v. Smith, 24 Utah 2d 443, 473 P.2d 
905, 906 (1970) and Randall v. Tracy Collins Trust Co., 6 Utah 2d 
18, 305 P.2d 480, 481 (1956), both similarly reflect the need for 
such an oral promise. 
As demonstrated in Point III, supra, the Roadway was to be 
reconveyed to the Individual Appellants. There is not a shred of 
evidence in the record that the Individual Appellants agreed to 
any easement before the Sharps1 execution of the Consent, or at 
any other time. The only argument the Sharps make in this regard 
is that Felton made certain oral representations to the Sharps' 
attorney, Heaton. Those representations were not only 
ineffective to bind the other Individual Appellants, but also 
were made on November 28f 1983 (F. 37, Add. 21), after the Sharps 
had signed the Consent (F. 38-39, Add. 21-22). Before that 
November 28, 1983 discussion, it was clear to Heaton, the Sharps1 
lawyer, that Felton rejected any notion that the Sharps were 
entitled to any access along the Roadway. (TR. 748, R. 1645). 
Moreover, the requirement that the alleged grantee of an 
easement by estoppel must have made improvements on the property 
subject to the alleged easement is reflected in the Sharps1 own 
case, Lyman Grazing Assfn. v. Smith, 24 Utah 2d 443, 473 P.2d 
905, 907 (1970) (partial performance requires actual use of the 
alleged easement). The Sharps have failed to prove any use or 
improvement of the alleged easement. Accordingly, there is no 
legal foundation for the existence of any easement over the 
Roadway in favor of the Sharps. 
POINT V 
THE LAW FAILS TO ESTOP THE SHARPS FROM 
DENYING ACCESS TO PUD LOT OWNERS 
The Sharps1 Point V responds to pages 18-19 of Appellants' 
Brief. This issue has been fully addressed by Appellants in 
those two pages, and they will not further address the legal 
arguments here.17 
17Apart from the legal dimension of this Point, however, it 
is important to note that had the Appellants not aggressively 
litigated this matter, the Sharps would have foreclosed access to 
Lots 1-5 exactly in the manner set forth in pages 18-19 of 
Appellants' Brief. By playing their cat-and-mouse game with 
their refusal to convey the Roadway to the Individual Appellants, 
and by their subsequent insistence in foreclosing that Roadway, 
the Sharps have interjected an unnecessary and costly element 
into this litigation that they now seek to make go away by a 
last-minute, so-called "stipulation". 
POINT VI 
THE SHARPS ARE LIABLE UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-1-33 
As demonstrated in Point II, supraf Appellants specifically 
requested a reconveyance of the Roadway on January 20, 1984. 
(Ex. 30f Add. 89). The Sharps' own counsel concurred that 
Appellants were entitled to a reconveyance of the Roadway. 
(Ex. 25, Add. 85; Ex. 131, Add. 134-35.). Nevertheless, it is 
similarly undisputed that the Sharps never requested the trustee 
to reconvey the Roadway to Appellants. 
Consequently, there is no dispute that the Sharps never 
requested the reconveyance of the Roadway as specifically 
mandated by § 57-1-33. At trial, the following exchange took 
place between Appellants1 counsel and Respondent John C. Sharp: 
Q Now, Mr. Sharp, it's correct, is it not, that your 
understanding that you were not obligated to release the 
road unless and until all payments on the property was 
(sic) made, the source of that understanding is out of 
your head and nowhere else; isn't that true? 
A. Yes. 
. . . 
Q. With respect to paragraph 3 [of the Memorandum], in 
consideration of the down payment referred to in 
paragraph 3 you've released three lots, did you not? 
A. Yes. 
Q. But you did not release the road, did you? 
A. No. 
Q. You have never released the road, have you? 
A. No. 
Q. Isn't it correct that the roadway was to be 
released at the time you released those three PUD lots? 
A. That's what the memorandum says. 
(TR. 45-46, R. 1642,) 
John Sharp unequivocally admitted that the decision not to 
release the Roadway was totally of his own making. The Sharps' 
lawyer also confirmed that Appellants were entitled to a release 
of the Roadway. (Exhibit 25, Add. 85). Notwithstanding (1) this 
admission by John Sharp and (2) Heaton's legal advice to the 
Sharps that they were obligated to release the Roadway, the trial 
court nonetheless inexplicably found that the Sharps "relied on 
the advice of attorney Jon Heaton". (F. 91, Add. 34.) 1 8 
The Sharps attempt to make this direct conflict go away by 
arguing, at page 37 of their Brief, that trial testimony is not 
binding. By the Sharps' own authority, however, a statement is 
binding if it is a "clear, deliberate, unequivocal statement of 
fact, not opinion". Hayes v. Xerox Corp., 718 P.2d 929, 931 
(Alaska 1986). John Sharp's statement that he alone determined 
not to release the Roadway is, in fact, such an "unequivocal 
statement of fact, not opinion". 
Predictably, the Sharps argue that his admission is taken 
"out of context". In support of that assertion, the Sharps cite, 
at page 38 of their Brief, various transcript pages which 
presumably provide the alleged "context". An examination of 
those pages, however, discloses nothing that makes John Sharps' 
testimony "equivocal". 
18This finding is also totally inconsistent with the Sharps' 
unsupportable contention that Heaton authored Ex. 25 in his 
capacity as Appellants' lawyer, and Heaton's testimony that he 
never advised Sharps to withhold release of the Roadway until the 
Trust Deed was paid in full. (TR. 797-803). 
Since (1) there is no support in the record for the finding 
that Respondent John Sharp refused to convey the Roadway upon the 
advice of counsel; (2) attorney Heaton in fact advised John Sharp 
on November 18, 1983 that Appellants were entitled to the 
Roadway; and (3) it is undisputed that the Sharps continued to 
refuse to request a reconveyance of the Roadway at all times 
after Appellants requested it, the Sharps unjustifiably violated 
§ 57-1-33, and Appellants are entitled to the statutory penalties 
provided for therein. 
POINT VII 
APPELLANTS ARE ENTITLED TO DAMAGES OR 
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE 
The Sharps1 Point VII is in response to pages 33-38 of 
Appellants' initial Brief. The Sharps make no argument in their 
Brief that merits a specific reply by Appellants, and Appellants 
merely refer this Court to the legal authorities contained at the 
foregoing pages of their initial Brief. 
CONCLUSION 
In their Brief, and in their opening statement at the trial, 
the Sharps seek to characterize Appellants as "desperate men" who 
ran out of money. More accurately, the Sharps are greedy 
individuals seizing on an irrelevant hypertechnicality — 
Appellants1 justified refusal to pay $3,200 in real estate 
taxes — to enrich themselves by hundreds of thousands of 
dollars. 
On January 18, 1984, the Sharps acknowledged that Appellants 
were entitled to Lots 1-5. If Appellants had not paid the Sharps 
one penny more, Appellants would still have received Lots 1-5. 
In fact, Appellants paid the Sharps hundreds of thousands of 
dollars more, an additional $321,660.51f to be exact. In 
addition, Appellants made improvements to the property totaling 
$1,063,348.00. 9 Notwithstanding the clear language of the 
Contract, the Sharps argue, however, that these massive 
additional payments bought Appellants nothing. The Sharps 
contend that Appellants1 expenditure of this additional 
$1,385,008.51 was a meaningless act, and that Appellants might as 
well not have bothered. As demonstrated above, Appellants had 
clearly defined, vested rights under the Contract that were 
secured by these expenditures. The trial court ignored these 
paid-for rights, and the Sharps now seek to have this Court 
affirm that legally unjustified and inequitable result. 
To the contrary, Appellants expended this $1,385,008.51 
since January 20, 1984 in justified reliance on explicit, 
unambiguous contract terms. That expenditure unequivocally 
entitled Appellants, at the least, to the Unreleased Property. 
For all the foregoing reasons, the trial court's decision 
should be reversed, and Appellants should be granted the relief 
requested in the Conclusion to their initial brief. 
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SUMMARY OF PAYMENTS 
Date Payment 
7/16/81 Down Payment 
— 11/28/80 check from WPR to 
Prince Yeates 
— 12/8/80 check from WPR to 
Prince, Yeates 
— Additional earnest money 
deposit with seller 
— 7/16/81 check from Associated 
Title to John & Geraldine Sharp 
— 7/16/81 cashier's check from 
First Interstate to Sharps 
-- 7/16/81 credit for water 
rights conveyed to Sharps 
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6/28/83 Felton 1983 Installment 
6/30/83 Saunders 1983 Installment 
11/14/83 Rees 1983 Installment 
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6/30/84 SLIC, Saunders, Rees 1984 Installment 
6/27/85 Felton 1985 Installment 
Amount 
$620,000.00 
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245,742.34 
149,433.01 
100,000.00 
$620,175.35 
TOTAL 
308,177.69 
71,266.09 
106,899.14 
118,397.39 
65,487.76 
196,463.28 
59,709.47 
1.546.400.50 
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OCOUCTION NET AMOUNT 
$245,742.34 
, • • * 
Note Department 
FUftCHASIO IV 
/AY 
NO.0029092 
July 16
 t , 81 
n 4 M i ' n t JCBN C. & GBRAIfllNE SHARP - — $ «l4Q.frTS.01« 
•«HK 
CASHIER'S CHECK 
5 k 
V J 
"•oneqoq s««« i:*2uoooo25i: 321010* o i o o o o o * 008S 
v •I V**?.*-* -v 
R R * • • » • 
White Pines Ranch 
1161 Park Avenue 
Park City, Utah 84060 
(801) 649-7638 
fSnl&SE PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHIJH, Trus t Accowt 
TEN THOUSAND ATO NO/100 
No. 
Novenber 28 19 80 
n i / i n t 
$ 10,000.00_ 
Dollars 
PARK CITY office 
t t f 4 PARK AVENUE • PARK CITY. UTAH M 0 » 
Foe 
•:.2i«oooo.2i: aa 00710 
I White P ines Ranch 
1161 Park Avenue 
Park C i t y , Utah 84060 
(801) 649-7638 
December 8 
Portle? §* PRINCE, VfcMES & GE1DZAHLER, Trus t Account 
No 2_ 
19 80 
IMflHt 
FIFIEEM TOOUSAND AND NO/100-
_ $ 15,000-00 
"Dollars 
PARK CITY office 
First Security Book of Utah 
18M PARK AVENUE • PARK CITY. UTAH MOM 
For_ 
•:.ei.ooooiet: 3a oo?io m 1 nJ 
A 
a 
PAY TO THE ORDER OF 
JOHN SHARP AND GERALDINE SHARP 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
TRUST ACCOUNT 
£g||M»g2* 
By. 
PAY TO THE ORDER OP 
JOHN SHARP AND GERALDINE SHARP 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
TRUST ACCOUNT 
SPECIALS & FELTON 
220 Coordhnad BnindU Cmrn 
324 Sou* S I M S«M 
SdtUfcftOiy.Uttlt 04111 
•01 380-9210 
June 30, 1982 
Mr John Sharp 
Dear Mr. Sharp: 
Enclosed is the payment due June 30, 1982, for the 
purchase of the property in White Pine. The total payment 
of $308,177.69 is composed of 3192,611.06 principal and 
5115,566.64 interest. Upon final plat approval, we 
will notify you to obtain the releases for the lots and 
the road as per the contract. 
Very truly your 
Robert Felton 
RF/tp 
£iicluaux c 
2 0055 
* 1 
r^jcu*.Ji>m<--« 
WHITE PINK> RVNCH 
P. P . iu;x i". ". ».-»--..;*! 
IfasstJWv. * 6*/*/*&. S(», 
1 0 2 8 
' / " 3Z/«... /yu>v 94/ ?i^-^ *v / / -^ *- t^-7 
First S««urlty Bonk -ae U'ah 
'V *r. 
i i » * 3 0087 
r \>$=ja*'xam STAT* NO. 22s tsf-ntt 
p ^ 4 , - - *»** «*«. 0*^ «*** *Hn 
^ • ? L r ^ feOKffT FELTQNr 
m***pi 
& 
G-t&iSa&J&WF S t ^ k l l V ^ CTIQ&A V f J 0 B £ r » « W 
>. 
lA*JTft.T» 
- R j . G. I— JV 
31-4-7 I , 
9AUNOCR* LAHO IWVMTWCNT CQRtfoteATiQK 
SALT LAKE rrHgjlj y ( M U I , 
PA>L 
TO 
TMf 
OftOKfl 
OF 
7 a 
T*Ai^ * i£>es* 
N2 1784 
UTAH P1MTVAMK 
THC BIUCXYAAQ 
S M C SOUTH 1300 KAMT 
P. O*. WOK • * • • * 
, CITY, UTAH «410# 
7 
H'OOOITSIH' i:k?M30 2 5?3»:u oooou qv &k / a o i a & a q q u / 
JY '83' 05 \ 
•AT ANT M N T 
124O-O091-* 
^T^TONTlfiENTAt 
f r * H M C & TRUST 
SAUNDERS LAND INVESTMENT CORPORATION 
1899 LONGVIIW DRIVE 278-2543 
SAIT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84117 
m 1873 
P A 
UTAH FilrSTBANK 
TMK BRICKYARD 
9199 SOUTH 1SOO KA9T 
P. O. BOX • ! • • 
^ 9ALT L9JCK CITY. UTAH R4109 
TO 
TMI 
[ OROER 
OF 
••000 IB 7 1 " i : i 2 i . 0 0 2 5 7 3 i : i l 00001. «K 
V f » K H » « U»*MBm • • « * MM* 
P A Y E E DETACH THIS STATEMENT BEFORE DEPOSITING SAUNDERS LAND INVESTMENT CORPORATION 
//-/>K3 
ACCOUNT OR 
INVOICE NO DESCRIPTION 
^ /!l<*r4 " " / / <\ - k ft},? f¥ 
^ 4 ^ ws~**w *v««*)# = 'frfifcfi 
AMOUNT DISCOUNT OR OEOUCTION NET AMOUNT 
EMPLOYEES 
NAME 
PAY PERIOO 
ENOING 
SJ >J^ ~**J~ >*„ ^M^S**/**S IVJ*^/} SAUNDERS IAND INVESTMENT CORPORATION 
l™ttU tt-&£^^ rZ?7Jr.. SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
HOURS 
REG T 
O T 
zz K~J"3v fay's.' A -
EARNINGS r -. . «. . \* »e»"^"»»M I STATf WITH 
-7P^ 
v vr ^ PAID 
T ' \ ' " ' - "_ 
^MWg3 
EMPLOYEE THIS IS A STATEMENT Or YOUR EARNINGS ANO DEDUCTIONS FOR PtRIOD INDICATED KEEP THIS FOR YOUR • T RECORO 
SAUNDERS LAND INVESTMENT CO 
1899 IONCV1EW OftlVf \278-2543 
SALT LMCI QTY, UTAH 84117 
CM 2 ^ ( ^ N 2 1873 
UTAH F1RSTBANK 
TMS SJtICJCYAJtD 
31*» SOUTH 1300 CA*T 
P. O. *OX • ! « • 
- « 4 I 0 # 
^Q^^lBM^; 
//-/4-S3 t//y^l? 
dlAA^itA/^ 
H*QQ0ia?3>a t:ist«oos5?3i:n QQOQI. «*«• bi / o o u a a q ? ^ / 
10 
5C*mr StATT. MO. 220 J5?-92U 
SAtT LAffK,OWr UTAH 14111 
1 2 » g r t« ff-V 
126 
tt-S/U* 
OoNws 
/ ZTONS 
Inmrad Monwlteriwt 
I  
™CTJg&H&M* B A N K 
«ALT LAJUt C1TY.UTAH t 4 t t t 
HISUDOOOSWI: oa su&u 2»* oia& 
#£flt £< 
/ 0 0 0 6 5Wfi??6/ 
SAUNDERS LAND INVESTMENT CO 
1899 LONCVICW DRIVE 278-2543 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84117 
0) M 1963 
UTAH PtftSTBANK 
TMC MKCXYARO 
3«SS COUTH 1SOO IA0T 
, J B 7 * . O. BOX 0119 
V"* //lh/ J&* Htf01 crrY,* "*»• •***• 
^ 7 O A T t W | # A - * e O U N Y 
/? 
fc-se-afUfo^S.S 
«
,oooit*&s»' •:ia«,ooa5?i*:ki QOOOU q«* &i sooiq&i.&aeas 
•»- ' i A - ' - -•- • C«*' 
€ * < t %* - '**>:» 
1 9 
ROBOT FELTON-jrtCAK>a*Tar* sane SM« WMAt 
SACT u a CITY, UTAH «4ttfr 
*gggyfffo £p+Cf»lfiW 
in 
OP THIS CHECK 
5 ^ ^ 
^%£* >**u rUx./i^ XUSMU+«V. 
&rtr 
i M A s t t M 
2J*8M*1J0tfilt 
8«t uiw c%. UIMI M I or 
|v^giQQQ7u»t o? ^q i s^y cma /aQ05<i?aqi. 
09 302 'P02^5 Z<~lb~ 
:7 3 i^ iT3 
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OWNERSHIP OF 
WHITE PINE RANCHES 
White Pine Ranches (60,078 acres) 
Sharps Saunders, Felton, Landes, Interstate 
(Warranty Deed, dated 6/30/81) 
Landes Daniel C. Hunter, III. 
(Warranty Deed, dated 8/12/81) 
Interstate Rees 
(Quit-Claim Deed, dated 10/29/82) 
Hunter SLIC 
(Quit-Claim Deed, dated 1/24/84) 
Phase I, White Pine Ranches platted, Lots 1-6 and Road (10/23/83) 
Lot 1 Felton 
Saunders, Felton, SLIC, Rees WPR 
(Special Warranty Deeds, recorded 3/30/84) 
WPR Felton 
(Warranty Deed, dated 3/30/87) 
Lot 2 WPR 
Saunders, Felton, SLIC, Rees WPR 
(Special Warranty Deeds, recorded 3/30/84) 
Lot 3 SLIC 
Saunders, Felton, Rees SLIC 
(Quit-Claim Deeds, recorded 2/6/85) 
Lot 4 —- Rees 
Saunders, Felton, SLIC Rees 
(Quit-Claim Deeds, recorded 2/27/85) 
Lot 5 WPR 
Saunders, Felton, SLIC, Rees WPR 
(Special Warranty Deeds, recorded 3/30/84) 
Lot 6 • Saunders, Rees, SLIC, Felton 
2 
SUMMARY OF OWNERSfflP 
White Pine Ranches 
Felton 100% 
Saunders 
Interstate 
(Norton) 
Landes 
Felton 100% 
Saunders 
Interstate 
Hunter (Landes) 
Felton 75% 
Saunders 
Interstate 
Hunter 
Felton 75% 
Saunders 
Rees (Interstate) 
Hunter 
Felton 75% 
Saunders 
Rees 
SLIC (Hunter) 
White Pine Ranches 
Property 
July 16, 1981 
Late 1981 
June 30, 1982 
October 1982 
WPR Agmt. 
S igned 
White Pine Enterprise 
WPR 25% 
WPR 
Howe l i s Inv. 
Company 
25% 
WPE 
25% 
WPE 
-
s 
\ 25% 
^/southern 
' portion 
A X W W C U W ««. *VCl|UC3(> WA-
at-
by-
M, Fee Paid $. 
. Dep. BooL—-. , Page- Ref.: 
Mail tax notice to. Grantee 
WARRANTY DEED 
(Special) 
PAUL H. LANDES 
of S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 
CONVEY AND WANLANT against all claiming by, through or under 
grantor 
hereby 
to DANIEL C. HUNTER III 
Park City, Utah 
grantee 
for the sum of 
TEN DOLLARS AND NO/100-(and other good and valuable DOLLARS, 
Consideration) 
the following described tract of land in Summit County, 
State of Utah: 
SEE EXHIBIT "A" ATTACHED HERETO AND BY THIS 
REFERENCE INCORPORATED HEREIN. 
, W O e
« > __ AtSTRACT '* 
WITNESS, the hand of said grantor , this 
August iA .D . 1981 
day of 
Signed in the Presence of 
AUL H. LANDES 
STATTOF UTtf^k 
County of Summit^  \ 
Qn tne* _lit3f \ day of Augus t , A. D. 19 8 1 
personally-appWbefore me ^
 ha^s 
the signer / ;x>f^ e> within instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that he executed the 
same. * • * . .••,,*° 
cajy Public 
My commission grpirga Julv 10* 1984 siding m Salt Lake County 
ATC 126 
17 
EXHIBIT "A" 
Beginning a t a p o i n t South 89°43*3S" West a long t h e 
North l i n e of Lot 8, 175.42 f e e t from t h e c o r n e r of Lots 
1 and 8, a b r a s s cap s e t by t h e U. S . Genera l Land O f f i c e , 
s a i d b r a s s cap a l s o be ing South 00°19 '46" West a long 
s e c t i o n l i n e 1336.14 f e e t from t h e N o r t h e a s t c o r n e r of 
S e c t i o n 1, Township 2 Sou th , Range 3 E a s t , S a l t Lake 
Base and M e r i d i a n ; and running thence South 89°43 , 36" 
West a long t h e North l i n e of Lo t s 7 and 8 2948.98 f e e t 
t o t h e Nor thwes t c o r n e r of Lot 7; t hence South 00 13*29" 
E a s t a long t h e West l i n e of Lot 7, 1312.84 f e e t t o 
t h e Southwes t c o r n e r of Lot 7; t hence North 8 9 0 4 7 , 4 1 , , 
East a long t h e South l i n e of Lot 7, 832.67 f e e t ; t hence 
North e^OO'OO" East 1956.90 f e e t ; thence North 4 7 ° 3 3 ' 
15" East 462.75 f e e t ; thence North 42°44M0" E a s t 85 .63 
f e e t t o the p o i n t of beg inning . 
SUBJECT TO Easements, Encroachments, R e s t r i c t i o n s , 
Rights -of -way and matters of record enforceable i n law 
or e q u i t y . 
0 3 
STATE OF UTAH ) ^ 
r^  
County of Summit ) ^ j 
CD 
I Alan Spnggs. County Recorder in and for Summit County State of Utah, ^ 
do hereby certify that the attached and foregoing is a full, true and correct copy 
of that certain CAJ e^^^t. v^ «~<, / z ^ ^ ' UPV 
r—* 
which appears of -ccord m rr.y of Bee m Book v> i i v5~
 % Page 7/p y/y 2 
being Entry No. / <£ I 6 i o ^ 
C 
IN WITNESS W H E ^ r ^ » *»ve hereunto set my hand and affixed my S 
Qiluiau seal. ih»s ^ j * ^ day of jr ^ u ^ - - j , / , / / - *•*• 
6 ( / u - ^ w JlC <-~>*^ 
Co**«y ttfesosder 
18 
QUIT CLAIM DEED 
This Quit Claim Deed, made and entered into on the 
of October, 1982, bet-sen Interstate Rental, Inc., 
a Nevada Corporation with its principal place of business and 
Lake County, State of Utah (herein-
trd Rees, an individual residing 
i \ \ \ \ "(headquarters located in Salt 1 
J i ; j M 
} • j i | Jafter "Grantor-) and J. Richaz 
! : i 1 ;in Weber County, State of Utah (hereinafter "Grantee*)i 
; : , ^ ; W I T N E S S E T H * 
Grantor, in consideration of the payment of Ten 
< * -. • ; 
O jjl - Oollars ($10*00) and other good and valuable consideration 
5 c3 ^  -: "v v. 
paid by the Grantee, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledges 
does hereby remise, release, and quit claim unto Grantee, its 
heirs, successors and assigns any and all Interests which Granted 
may have in that certain plot, piece or parcel of land with 
buildings and improvements thereon, errected, situate, lying and 
being in Summit County, State of Utah and being more fully descriL«< 
in Exhibit "A" which is attached hereto and incorporated herein 
by reference together with all right, title, and interest, i\ 
any, of the Grantor in and to any streets, roads or other improve* 
ments abutting the above described premises together with appurtu./.. 
and all other estates and/or rights of the Grantor in and to th« 
premises, to have and to hold the premises herein granted to 
the Grantee or its heirs and successors and assigns forever. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Grantor has duly executed 
this deed this day and year first above written* 
INTERSTATE RENTAL, INC. 
^ w / ^ f K ^ g a ^ I t « J yZ2 STATI OF UTAH ) ^ - ^ y / ^ ^ g 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) ^ 
On this ;2,f day of October, 1982, Kenneth R, Norte* , 
did appear before me and after being first duly sworn did st.-tr 
that he is the President and Chief Executive Officer of Interst.. 
Rental, Inc., the Grantor described in the Quit Claim Deed above,
 u" 
.tfeat he is authorized to execute this Quit Claim Deed and by it 
ntee any right, title or interest which he %. 
property described in Exhibit "A" attached 1* 
^^j^r^s^r to the Gra 
^*&V- jasi'Jnov have in the 
1 9 7 6 1 3 Notary Public Q 
ounty QQ Er.fry V.9. *"".ld.f.nS - * n - ^ & V £ M r c< 
pec
 V/A.:;A ' i . - : *.••/,• co. n^--<K{ 
INOEXEO A«ST«ACT ^ L ^ - A f 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
Beginning at a point South 89° 43* 36- West along the North 
line of Lot 8, 175.42 feet from the corner of Lots 1 and 8, a 
brass cap set by the U. S. General Land Office, said brass cap 
also being South 00° 19' 46" West along section line 1336.14 
feet from the Northeast corner of Section 1, Township 2 South, 
Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; and running thence 
South 89* 43' 36" West along the North line of Lots 7 and 8 
2948.98 feet to the Northwest corner of Lot 7; thence South 
00° 13' 29" East along the West line of Lot 7, 1312.84 feet to 
the Southwest corner of Lot 7; thence North 89* 47* 41" East 
along the South line of Lot 7, 832.67 feet; thence North 61° 
00* 00" East 1956.90 feet? thence North 47* 33' 15" East 
462.75 feet; thence North 42° 44' 40" East 85.63 feet to the 
point of beginning. 
SUBJECT TO Easements, Encroachments, Restrictions, Rights-of-Way 
and matters of record enforceable in law or equity. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
County of Summit ) 
1 Alan Spngga, County Recorder tn and tor Sumn* County. State of Utah, 
do hereby certify that the attached and torego«ig w a fun, true and correct copy 
of that certaei c ^ v ^ ( C v. ~~ •— / ^ - c c j 
which appears of record ft my office in Book - s ? . Pipe € *i v O J 
bemg Entry No. / f ?#/ L~ 
officjji 
#JTN6SS WHEREOF. I have hereunto set my hand and aUhced my 
a j p L t t e W J - w dayof j/Cu ^ / / 9 i t 
Summit County Recorder 
B00KM237PAGE bl& 
Recorded at Request of - _ 
at.... M Fee Paid $ ,__ 
by Dep. Book . Page . Ref.:.. .............. 
1899 Longview Drive 
Mail tax notice to g £ l n t e e Address...._ialtL„Lak^.QltXi__JJ.tah„1412 4 
QUIT-CTAIM DEED 
Dan C. Hunter, III grantor 
of Park City, Utah .County of Summit , State of Utah, hereby 
QUIT-CLAIM to Saunder's Land Investment Corporation 
, Park City, 
o r
 TEN AND NO/100 
grantee 
for the sum of 
I and other good and valuable considerations) BOLLARS, 
County, the following described tract of land in Summi t 
State of Utah: 
See Exhibit "A" attached hereto and by th is reference made a part 
hereof. 
fcniiy No 2 1 6 0 8 4 
W Q U M T OF . J W O O A i g L I ^ ^ 
zy-e± 
WITNESS the hand of said grantor , this 24th day of 
January , A. D. one thousand nine hundred and Eighty Four 
Signed in the presence of 
Dan C. Hunter, III 
STATE OF UTAH, 1 ^ BOOK 2 8 8 PAGE414 
County of Summit J 
On the 24th day of January A. D. one 
thousand nine hundred and Eighty Four personally appeared before me ,.» 
Dan Co Hunter, III 
the signer of the foregoing instrument, who duly acknowledge to me that: he ? executed the!
 t 
; * 
My commission expires 9-14-85 A d d n f i ^ r t City, Utah - J — A , J 
21 
R6COROW5 MEMO 
nSHfllTY OF WRITING TYPING OJR 
i . u , t , n > MINTING UNSATISFACTORY IN THIS 
L X H ) I. IT H B S S M I I I WHEN RSCEW60. 
BEGINNING AT THE NORTHEAST CORNER OF SECTION 1, TOWNSHIP 2 SOUTH, RANGE 
;< LAST, SALT LAKL BAST AND HER)OIANf AND 1WIMJUU THENCE SOUTH Q DEGREES 
IV HINUTES 46 SECONDS WEST, 13,16,14 FEET TO THE COrtrtON CORNER OF 
GOVF.KNntNT I OTii 1 AND 8 OF SAID SECTION If THENCE SOUTH 09 DKoREKS 43 
HINUTES 36 SECONDS WEST, 173.42 FEET TO THE TRUE POINT OF 
I'.F.GIMNINGf THENCE SOUTH 09 DEGREES 43 KINUTES 36 SECONDS WEST ALONG THE 
NORTHERLY BOUNDARY OF PHASE I, UNITE PINE RANCHES, 2940.90 FEET* THENCE 
COUTH 0 DkGRtES 13 MINUTES 29 SLCONDS EAST ALONG THE UTTERLY I INE OF 
PHASE X, WHITE PINE RANCHES I0U.05 FEETj THENCE NORTH 65 DCGREES 44 
hJNUTFS 00 SECONDS EAST, 571.36 I FET TO A POINT OM A 60.UU TOOT RADIUS-
CURVE TO THE LEFT (CENTER SEARS NORTH 60 DEGREES OU HINUTES UU SECONDS 
EASl, 60.00 FEET OF WHICH CENTRAL ANGLE IS 104 DEGREES 16 HINUTES 02 
bECONDS)* THENCE SOUTHEASTERLY ALONG THE ARC OF SA(I) CURVE 109.19 FEET 
10 A POJNI ON A 2S.U0 f 00 f RADIUS REVERSE CURVE 10 THE RIGHT (CENTER 
BEARS SOUTH 44 DEGREES 16 HINUTES 02 SECONDS EAST, 25.00 FCET OF WHICH 
TIIK CLNTRAL ANGLE IS 40 DEGREES 06 MINUTES 07 SECONDS) * THENCE 
NORTHEASTERLY ALONG THE ARC OF SAID CURVE 20,99 FCET TO A POINT ON A 
209.11 RADIUS REVERSE CURVE TO THE LEFT (CENTER BEARS NORTH 03 DEGREIS 
SU .ilNUTES 05 SECONDS EAST, 2U9.U FEET OF WHICH THE CENTRAL ANGLE IS 4U 
DEGREES 50 HINUTES 05 SECONDS) -9 THENCE NORTHEASTERLY ALONG THE ARC OF 
SAID CURVE 149.U.3 FEET TO A POINT ON A 7U.UU FOOT RADIUS RFVERSC CURVE 
TO THE RIGHT (CENTER DEARS SOUTH 37 DEGREES OU HINUTES 00 SECONDS CAST, 
70.UO FEET OF WHICH THE CENTRAL ANGLE IS 15 DEGREES 07 HINUTES 05 
SfcCONUS)j IHM.'fE NORTHEASTERLY ALONG THE A^C OF SAID CURVE A DISTANCE OF 
42.91 FEET VO A POINT OF TANGENCY* 1 HENCE NORTH 00 DEGREES 07 HINUTES US 
SLCONDS I AST, 29.J.4J FEET TO A POINT ON A 405.00 FOOT RADIUS CURVE TO 
THE LEFT (CENTER rtEARS NORTH U» DEGREES 52 HINUTES 55 SECONDS WEST, 
40t..U0 I EFT Oh WHICH HIE CENTRAL ANGLE IS 46 DEGREES 27 HINUTLb 05 
SECONDS)? THKNCE NORTHEASTERLY At ONG THE ARC Of SAID CURVE 32U- ?«5 FEET 
fO A POINT OF TANGENCY* THENCE NORTH 41 DEGREES 40 niNUTFS 00 SI-LONDS 
EAbf, 70.91 FEET TO A POINT ON A 471.04 FOOT RADIUS CURVE TO THE RIGHT 
(CLNTTR AFARS SOUTH 40 DEGREES 20 HINUTES 0(r SECONDS EAST, 471.04 i FET 
HAVING A CENTRAL ANGLE OF 33 DEGREES 20 HINOTES 00 SECONDS); THENCE 
NORTHEASTERLY ALONG THE ARC OF SAID CURVE 274.04 FEET TO A POINT ON A 
S02./0 FOOT RADIUS REVERSE CURVE TO THE LEFT (CENTER BEARS NORTH 15 
DECREES 00 HINOTES 00 SECONDS UEST, 502.70 FEET OF WHICH THE CLNTRAL 
ANGLE IS U DEGREES 00 HINUTES OU SECONDS) f THENCE NORTHEASTERLY Al ONO 
IID ARC OF SAID I URVE 96.bl IT! T TO A POINT OF TANGKNCY? THENCE NORTH 64 
DEGREES 00 HINUTES 00 SLCONDS EAST, 79.95 FEET TO A P0IN1 ON A IbU.OU 
FOOT RADTMS CURVI TO THE LEFT (CENTER REARS NORTH 26 DEGREES OU HINUTES 
OU ' I.IX»N0S WEST, 350-00 I*EE T OF WHICH THE CENTRAL ANSI E It? 16 DEGREES OL 
hJNUTLS UO SECONDS) p THfcHCI. NVKTH' ASTERLY ALONG THE ARC OF SAID I UPVE 
9'.74 R f T TO A POINT «F TANUENCff THENLE NORTH 40 DEGREES OU HIN'HTES Qc 
SEfOf.'hS' fASf, ,'2K0S H I T TO A POINT ON A P.L'd.UO l»OOT RADIUS lUHVE TO 
THI- r< tiiiir (CENTLR HEARS SOU III 42 DEGREES 00 HINUTES 00 SECONDS FAS), 
^?0.U0 H L T OF WHICH TNF. CTNTRAL ANSI C IS 42 DEGREES 00 HJNUTrs OU 
SECONDS)? THENiT NOR THEASTERt Y ALONG THE ARC OF SAID CURVE 161.^7 TrE T 
TO A POINT OF TANCENCt? THFNLL NORTH 9U DEGREES 00 niNUTCS 00 SECONDS 
{•.-ST, 100.36 FEET TO A POINT ON A 104.43 Fi.»OT RADIUS CURVE TO THE RIGHT 
(LFNlFK P.KAKl> SOUTH OU DFGk'fcFS 00 HINUTES 00 SECONDS FAbT, 104.43 I EFT 
OF '-HITCH THE CENTRAL ANGLE IS 45 OEGREES 00 HINUTES 00 bFCONI,'S>? THENCE 
SOUPIFASTLRI Y Al ONG THE ARC OF SAJD CURVE 02.\}'/ FLET TO A POINT ON A 
IV.V4 FOOT RADfUS REVERSE CURVE TO THE LEFT (CENTER BEARS HORTU 45 
DKoPfES 00 HINUTES OU SECONDS FAST, K<2.94 I F.ET OF WHICH Tlifc CENTRAL 
AN..I i- IS 6ri DEGREES OH HTNUTf.R OU SECONDS); THENCE SOUTHEASTER! < *VKWt 
°9 
y KecoftDs*** uma 
03T<llJTY OF WRITING, W I N G 0 1 
HINTING UNSATISFACTORY IN THIS 
I' VH11 ' I T A DOCUMENT WHEN RECEIVED. 
THF. AKC OF SAID CUK'.'F 1 3 0 . 0 1 FEET TO A POINT ON A 1 0 7 . 0 4 FOOT f ^ O I U S 
LUkVL TO T»IF I El T l U ' N l F R P.EARL, NORTH ?.U DEGKELS 00 ftlNUTEC 00 r>h.l<HlDS 
oEfir, tu7.n; FECI OF U H I M I THE CENTRAL ANGLE I S in DGGREEG OO n[.MUTES OI. 
£i;COUD!i>> THENCh f-WTUGAS 11*1*1 Y ALONG THE ARC Of- SAID CURVE fJV.,01 i'LCl T( 
A POINT OF TANUENCf? THENLG NORTH 5? DEGREES 00 ,'1INUTE*> 00 SECONDS EA?;T, 
17.. 1#J M'LT 70 A POINT ON A 129.Z6 IO<>T RADIUS IURVF TO Tilt RIGHT (LTNll.K 
IU-AKS fiOUTII 30 DEGREES 00 MNUTEO 00 SECONDS EAST, 12V,.VJ hTF.f OF yilXCII 
THK CLNTRAL ANOl F J 8 )U DEGkECK 00 MINUTES 00 SECONDS; THFNLfc 
NORTHEASTERLY ALONG THE ARC «>F JiAtO CURVE 40.44 FEET TO A PO'NT 0-1 A 
aU.UO FOOT KAD7U<i CUkVK 7 0 7 HF RIGHT (CEN7ER DEAR? SOUTH 20 PEOKLCS UO 
ntNUlEU 00 GECOND'j EAST, 20.00 FEET OF WHICH THE CENTRAL ANGLE 1*3 L JL0 
DEGREES 00 rtlNUTES 00 SECONDS)
 9 THENCE SOUTHEASTERLY ALONG THE HRC Of 
SAID CURVE 10.40 FEET TO A POINT OF TANGENCY; THENCE GOUTH 00 DEGREES 00 
NJNUThS 00 SECONDS EAST, 35.6? FEET TO A POINT ON A 00.00 FOOT KAOJUS 
CURVE TO THE LEFT (CENTER BEARS NORTH VU DEGREES 00 NINUTEf> 00 SECONDS 
LAST, OU.UO FEL7 OF I'HICH THE CENTRAL ANGLE IS 31 DEGREES 27 ftlNUTGS 5? 
SECONDS)p THENCE fJOU THEA5TERLY ALONG THE ARC OF GAID CURVE 43.94 FEET TO 
A POINT ON THE Ufc'JlERlY RIGHT OF WAY OF UHITE PINE CANYON ROAD? THENCE 
NORTH 47 DEGREES 13 MINUTES 15 SECONDS EAST ALONG SAID RIGHT OF UAY 
159.02 I'LETp THtflCE NORTH 42 DEGREES 44 MINUTES 40 SECONDS EA<JT ALONG 
SAID RIGHT OF UAY 85.63 FEET TO THE TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING. 
TOGETHER 1'ITH A HON-EXCLUSIVE IASEHENT FOR UATKR I IKES, WATER TANK ANO 
HATER SYSTEflS OVER, UNDER ANO ACROSS THE PROPER fY ADJACENT TO THE SOUTH 
OF THE SUP.JFC1 PROPERTY. 
Also known as White Pine Ranches Subdivision 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
County o* Summit ) 
lAianSpngos. County Recorder* and for SummH County. State <X Uta^OOK 2 8 8 P A G E 4 2 6 
do hereoy certify>at the attached awtHpregoino. « a fuM. true and correct copy 
of that certain £fe*Cf (?&4^— \^t<-& 
which appears of record m rnyorfice in Book J^y ? . Paga </*/ 
being Entry No. ^ / £ 0 6> f 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF. j j iave hereunto set my harxl and affixed my 
o?t»oa» seat, this J2 S** oay of ^+4*^ ^ y , / / f d 
Summit County Recorder ^ 
23 
Recorded at Request of 
at .M. Fee Paid $ _ 
**- _, 
Mall tax notice to: 
Dep. Book Page Ref.r ~~ __ 
Hy Saunders, Address: 1899 Longvlew Dr., SakTake City, Utah f*4lty 
C O R R E C T E D 
Q U I T - C L A I M DEED 
DANIEL HUNTER, IH, grantor of Dana Paint, State of California, hereby Quit-
Claims to SAUNDERS LAND IN VEST ME NT* CO., grantee o^1899 Longvlew Dr., Salt Lake 
CpyJTpfch for Che sum of Ten ($10.00) Dollars the following described tract of land in 
'~ ffounty, State of Utah: 
Beginning at a point South 89° 43* 36" Vest along the North 
line of Lot 8, 1/5.42 feet from the corner of Lots 1 and 8, a 
brass cap set by the U.S. General Land Office, said brass cap 
also being South 00° 19146*f Vest along section line 1336J4 feet 
from the Northeast corner of Section 1, Township 2 South, 
Range 3 East. Salt Lake Base and Meridian; and running thence 
South 89° 43* 36" Vest along the North line of Lots 7 and 8 
2948.98 feet to the Northwest corner of Lot 7; thence South 
00° 13* 29" East along the Vest line of Lot 7 1312.84 feet to the 
Southwest corner of Lot 7,thence North 89 47* 41" East along 
the South line of Lot 7, 832.67 feet: thence North 61° 00' (XT 
East 1956.90 feet: thence North 47* 33' 15" East 462.75 feet; 
thence North 42* 44» 40" East 85.63 feet to the point of 
beginning* 
Contafa* 60.078 
WITNESS the hand of said grantor, this g^dayof Jb*v+r 
thousand nine hundred and *Hfh¥y ft**. ntor,i '+ , A.D.one 
Signed in the presence of: 
£*+~*fi /6**2Z±. 777 
STATE OF CALIFORNIA ) 
COUNTY OF. JPt Angelas ) 
&0Q< ,. 327*417 
and 
On the 2nd day of January A.D. one thousand nine hundred 
v g personally appealed before me Daniel Hunter, HI, the signer of the 
ment, who duly acknowledged that he executed the same. foregoing instru 
Ny Com mission Expires: 
ApWT 7S J TQfifi 
Residing at: Long Beach, California 
4 4 
324 so. stat* st. suite 220 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
SPECIAL WARRANTY DEED 
SAUNDERS LAND INVESTMENT CORPORATION 
, a corporation 
organism ana existing under the kw* of the State of Utah, with its principal office at 
, of County of Summit , State of Utah, 
grantor, hereby CONVEYS AND WARRANTS against all claiming by, through or under it to 
WHITE PINE RANCHES a Utah Partnership 
grantee 
of for the sum of 
TEN DOLLARS AND OTHER GOOD AND VALUABLE CONSIDERATION™—DOLLARS, 
the following described tract of land in Summit County, 
State of Utah: 
Lota I , 2 and 5, WHITE PINE RANCHES PHASE I , a planned 
Reaidenta l Development, according to the o f f i c i a l p l a t 
t h e r e o f on f i l e and of record in the Sunmit County 
Recorder's Of f i ce . 
fcmry NO 21SS^2 
ASSOCIATED TITLE &0MPANY ! 
PEOUEST OF . 
RF.-.WOED j j f t t l M ^ j L , ^ 
The officers who atgn this <ked hereby certify that this (ktd and the transfer represented 
thereby wan duly authorised under a resolution duly adopted by the board of directors of the 
grantor at a lawful meeting duly held and attended by a quorum. 
In witness whereof, the grantor has caused its corporate name and seal to be hereunto affixed 
by its duly authorized officers this day of February , AJD. 1984 
A t t a t :
 ) „^STOEWJL^_ 
. « V V . i
 fV . Seoeory. / > ^ ff * O ) QUL^Jj^c. 
>io$j*c^^ / President. 
V^^i^^^i^^^ ***<* February , A , D . 1984, 
„ ore me and 
who bdbg^;me ^Sy-sworn <&&&$sta& tot hwajeifc tfaae-bev che«ttd 
isthe 7fpres1dmt,andhetthrjaid^>^ << x*'- -< ••; ' • is the secretary 
of SAUNDERS LAND INVESTMENT CORPORATION , and that the within and foregoing 
instrument was signed in behalf of said carporafcon by authority of a resolution of its board of 
directorvand aaid ^ and 
each duly acknowledged to me that said corporation executed' t£e same and that the seal affixed 
is the seal of said corporation. 
«. '^£XC2^^SS^ Notary Public 
My commission expires....^-?. .?!>\ - • My residence ^^9SX^t&^miJ2T..U^tJ^ 
8oc?i85 ?AGt335 
o r : 
WHfcIN K t L U K U b U , MAIL IIT 
White Pine Ranches 
324 So. State St . , Suite 220 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Space Above This Line for Recorder's Use 
W A R R A N T Y DEED 
(Special) 
ROBERT FELTON 
o( 
CONVEY AND WARRANT against all claiming by, through or under 
to WHITE PINE RANCHES a Utah Partnership 
of 
TEN DOLLARS 
And other good and va luab le c o n s i d e r a t i o n . 
the following described tract of land in 
State of Utah: 
A l l of Lots 1, 2 , & 5 White Pine 
Ranches Phase 1 a planned R e s i d e n t i a l 
Development. 
grantor 
hereby 
grantee 
for the sum of 
DOLLARS, 
County, 
EOSTNO 2 i^5TF3 1 
ASSOCIATED TITLE 80MPANY ! 
PEQOeST Oe 
reE & Htthgiccs u, - co .pfcoar,-.-
[ f i ry . - . f" Mtf»»«< •» \ . . * i ^ _ . 
WITNESS, the hand of aid grantor , thi ^ I**/ day of 
Signed in the Presence of a*u- ?u& 
ROBERT FELTON 
STATE OF UTAH, 
County of 
On the-''4 ' ' ' -#** daf-of * ' ^ 4 ^ 
personally apj&ared before me * f 3P ' * * -1 
,A.D.l9r/ 
the signer ' vxrf the within instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that he executed the 
-same*- , I v. t * / ' 
* • ". * ^ * 
_V, 4 - commas ^ p A u ^ g l i l — 7 ^Reading III fV? f7? .'<>»<? ,. - ^  /_ . 
-- ?'r
 B
:r ^y • •! - - ^80.^36 
2( 
WHEN RECORDED, MAIL TO 
White Pine Ranches 
324 So. State S t . , Suite 220 
Salt Lake City, Utah Space Above This Line for Recorder's Use 
WARRANTY DEED 
(Special) 
LEON H. SAUNDERS 
CONVEY AND WARRANT against all claiming by, through or under 
to WHITE PINE RANCHES a Utah Partnership 
TEN DOLLARS AND OTHER GOOD AND VALUABLE CONSIDERATION-
the following described tract of land in Summit 
State of Utah: 
grantor 
hereby 
grantee 
for the sum of 
—DOLLARS, 
County, 
Lots 1, 2 and 5, WHITE PINE RANCHES PHASE I , a planned 
Res identa l Development, according to the o f f i c i a l p la t 
thereof on f i l e and of record in the Summit County 
Recorder's O f f i c e . 
PEGUEST OF 
FH5 .SS-
ASSOCIATED TITLE COMPANY j 
vr •ggg.v.rasfr-.L 
(RFOOqOED MAR*** * * - V' ^OA 
WITNESS, the hand of said grantor .this 2 2v~L 
February , A. D. \9 84, 
Signed in the Presence oi 
~"pr;^r ^ *— 
5TXTE.QF JLTlkril * ? * •, ) 
CiintVof.v-.Summit ^ *• * J 
' • 6ncthe ?..^2^L - ; : day of 
I M I I I M " « 1 f - — , 
February 
LEON H. SAUNDERS 
, A. D. \9 8 4 
personaU^appeared before me 
the signers r ot the within instrument, who duly acknowledged to me thatf he eiecuttd the 
same* r 
": * HO£95 ,^w^ - """^2^1 
My commission expirtJ~<r.r-2-_i 
Notary Public. 
inVW-lQ.P UAdk. 
27 
WHEN RECORDED, MAIL TO. 
Mail 
of 
tax notice to .White Pine Ranches Address 324 South State Street,Suite 220 
WARRANTY DEED*1'""cu* ut*h 
(Special) 
J. RICHARD REBS 
grantor 
hereby 
CONVEY * AND VABAANT S against all claiming by, through or under 
to 
WHITE PINE RANCHES, a Utah partnership grantee 
of for the sum of 
Ten Dollars and Other Good and Valuable Considerations DOLLARS, 
the following described tract of land in Summit County, 
State of Utah: 
All of Lots I, 2, 5, WHITE PINE RANCHES, Phase I, a Planned Residential 
Unit Development 
WITNESS, the hand of said grantor , this 
, A. D. 19 
Signed in the Presence of 
day of 
X^LQAC^A(3^^ 
STATE OF UTAH, 1 
County of U ^ J * J 
On the ££***
 d a y o £ ^ X « f ~ £ 
personally appeared before me * 
the signer of the within instrument, who duly acknowledged to 
<4fIM 
BSOX£95 r«s334 -"-'; II. 
ASSOCIATED TITLE COMPANY 
Notary Public 
Residing 
My Commission 
SALT LAKE 3 6 V BOUNTII-VJL2W-Z4CU, 3REM 22*4133 »ARK CITY 532-6428 
28 
ftccorded at IU . e s t of: Robert Felton 80 "S" Street ,LC, Ut«. 54103 
#t M. Fee Paid $ . . 
fey Dep. Book Page Ref: 
Hail tax notice to: Robert Felton, 80 "S" Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
V A R I A I T 7 D E E D 
WHITE PINE RANCHES, a Utah general partnership, Grantor, hereby conveys 
*nd warrants to ROBERT FELTON, Grantee, of Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, for the sum of TEN DOLLARS ($10.00) the following described 
tract of land In Summit County% State of Utah: 
Lot 1, White Pine Ranches Phase 1, a Planned Residential 
Development, according to the official plat thereof on 
file and of record in the Summit County Recorder's 
Office. 
WITNESS the hand of said Grantor this 2 V W of March, 1987. 
Signed in the Presence of 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On the ^ S C d«y of March, 1987, personally appeared before ae ROBERT 
fELTON, General Partner in the Partnership of White Pine Ranches who by me 
feeing first duly sworn did state that he executed this Deed for and on behalf 
Oi the Partnership, as a general partner of the Partnership and by authority 
PARTIAL DEED OF RECONVEYANCE 
TRACY-COLLINS BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, as Trustee under a Trust Deed 
dated December 1 19 83 , executed by ___ 
WHITE PINE RANCES, A Utah Partnership 
_, as Trustor, and 
recorded on December 27 , 19 83 . as Enury No. 214571 
B ° o k 283 Page 135-137 of records of the County Recorder of Summit 
County, Utah, pursuant to a written request of the Beneficiary thereunder, does 
hereby reconvey without warranty, to the person or persons entitled thereto, a 
part of the trust property now held by it as Trustee under said Trust Deed, which 
Trust Deed covers real property situated in Summit County, State 
of Utah, described as follows: 
All of Lot 1, WHITE PINE RANCHES PHASE 1, a planned residential 
development. 
RECORDED AT REQUEST OF 
269591 
1987 APR - 6 FN 2 13 
AL~N br-^GGS 
SUMMIT C:j*Tf RECORDER 
S£C 'OBY/Vr 
This Partial Deed of Reconveyance shall in no manner affect the remainder of lands 
described in said Trust Deed. 
Dated this 31 day of March ., 19 S7 . 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss: 
COUNTY OF Salt t>ke 
On the 31 day of. 
Jay Haskell 
the Authorized Agent 
TRACY-COLLINS BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, 
TRUSTEE 
BY: 
Jay Haskell 
Authorized Agent 
»» 426^:752 
March -> > 
corporation, and that the fore 
tion, by authority of a re 
Jay Haskell s^/S^h\ 
as Trustee. 
My Commission Expires. 
April 19, 1987 
,j 19&7 . personally appeared before 
, who being by me duly sworn did say that he is 
" of TRACY-COLLINS BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, a 
instrument was signed in behalf of said corpora-
^ , ^ £ 3 Bolard of Directors, and. said. 
if^Vfl^B* that said Corporation executed the saoe 
'rf: r\\ A\v>> . ^  <d 
Notary Puolifc 
n*s,idui$ it'"garrrarce
 c i
r \ , 'Jtan 
30 
PARTIAL DEED OF RECONVEYANCE 
TRACY-COLLINS BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, as Trustee under a Trust Deed 
dated December 1 1983 . executed by _ _ _ 
WHITE PINE RANCES, a Utah Partnership 
recorded on 
, as Trustor, and 
December 27 . 19 83 . as Entry No. 214569 in 
Book 283 Page 130-132 of records of the County Recorder of Summit 
County, Utah, pursuant to a written request of the Beneficiary thereunder, does 
hereby reconvey without warranty, to the person or persons entitled thereto, a 
part of the trust property now held by it as Trustee under said Trust Deed, which 
Trust Deed covers real property situated in Summit County, State 
of Utah, described as follows: 
All of Lot 1, WHITE PINE RANCHES PHASE 1, a planned residential 
development. 
RECORKD AT REUIEST OF 
2695^2 
B87 APR - 8 PH 2 13 
ALAN t^HIGGS 
SUMMIT COUHfY RECOROER 
*EC'0 «,7)P ^ g 
This Partial Deed of Reconveyance shall in no manner affect Che remainder of lands 
described in said Trust Deed. 
Dated this 31 day of March ., W&L 
TRACY-COLLINS BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, 
TRUSTEE 
BY: MVTJJJLZ^ 
jCy Haskell 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss: 
COUNTY OF Salt pake 
Authorized Agent 
800* 426**753 
On the 31 day of._ 
Jay Haskell 
narc-n . , 19 87 , personally appeared before 
, who being by me duly sworn did say that he is 
the Authorized Agent of TRACY-COLLINS BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, a 
corporation, and that the foregoing instrument was signed in behalf of said corpora-
tion, by authority of a resolu£sjpJHfc^Ats Board of Directors, and said 
Jay Haskell ac^P55S5*/>5^D e t n a c s a l d Corporation executed the same 
as Trustee. 
My Commission Expires 
A p r . l V ^ 9 6 " 
Notary Public 
Residing" at -aU lak* ~i»y. J»ar 
Recorded at Request of 
_ .M. Fee Paid $ _ at 
by- . Dep. Book. Page. Ref.:-
Mail tax notice to Address.. 
QUIT-CLAIM DEED 
J. Richard Rees, as to an undivided TWenty-Five Percent Interest:. 
of Ogden , County of Weber 
QUIT-CLAIM to Saunders Land Investment Corp. 
grantor 
, State of Utah, hereby 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
***Tten*** 
the following described tract of land in Summit 
Sate of Utah: 
grantee 
for the sum of 
DOLLARS, 
County, 
ALL CF LOT 3 , WHITE PINE RANCHES PHASE I , A PLANNED RESIDENTIAL DEVELOPMENT, 
ACCORDING TO THE CFFICIAL PEAT THEREOF CN FILE AND CF RECORD IN THE SUWTT 
COUNTY RECORDER'S OFFICE. 
ouo« 330ftfi465 
WITNESS the hand of said grantor , this 5th 
Feb. , A. D. one thousand nine hundred and Eight-Five 
day of 
Signed in the presence of l/2:aw(iS».«&,*|5ar 
}" STATE OF UTAH, County of 
On the 5th. day of Feb. A. D. one 
thousand nine hundred and eighty-five personally appeared before me J. Richard Pees, MD 
V \ \ U « » ' *" 
the signer of the foregoing instrument, who duly acknowledge to g 
^ f t U c / y > 
My commission expires Add* 
•LANK ho. io»— fj acta rr«. co — sii» •© i«oo «A»T — *M.T LAPS cirr 
- - - * & * & , >>* 
3 2 
Recorded at Request of ... ,._. 
at. M. Fee Paid $ _ 
by . Dep. Book Page Ref.: 
Mail tax notice t o . . . 6 & ^ i ^ ^ \ i v . * ^ £ Addre$s...!^..W..C^..Aj?i^.S^^Q 
QUIT-CLAIM DEED 
Robert Felton, as to an undivided TVenty-Five Percent Interest 
grantor 
of Salt Lake City
 f County of Salt Lake , State of Utah, hereby 
QUIT-CLAIM to Saunders Land Investment Corp. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
***tei*** 
the following described tract of land in Summit 
State of Utah: 
grantee 
for the sum of 
DOLLARS, 
County, 
ALL OF LOT 3 , WHITE PINE RANCHES PHASE I , A PLANNED RESIDENTIAL DEVELOPMENT, 
ACCORDING TO THE CFFICIAL PLAT THERECF ON FILE AND OF RECORD IN THE SUIWIT 
coutrn RECORDERS OFFICE. 
Entry No 2 3 0 3 0 0 
REQUEST OF ^ S O f f i ^ ^ 
RECORCE0 
SUMMIT CO ^cCC3k.?« 
31 V ^ > W 
V l the hand of said grantor , this 
, A. D. one thousand nine h 
TTNESS the J 
Signed in the presence of 
STATE OF UTAH, 
County of «Si/V„ 0<^ 
On'the ,jf^ 
thoosa^nii^J^iiiidieosaiid 
m* 330**466 
f-, day of 
A. D. one 
personally appeared before me 
the signer of th^/foregbingflutrument, wno auly acknowledge to me that he executed the 
— r — i - o r -"-y*1—•*- . *^ — 
Addret: .. i < ^ 
~~~~WCAHlCt(fri4'%~Q«Smft9~co «*» sal? so asoo CAST — SACT uuu.crrv 
... S 
Recorded at Request oL Foothill Thrift 1304 Foothill Or. Salt Lake City, Ut 84108 
at... M. Fee Paid $. 
by Dep. Book- Page- Ref.: 
Mail tax notice t o A ^ L ^ A A \ V f t > r ^ S T • A d d r e s s . . . ^ , k . . . C : . . A j s i ^ _ S ^ O 
QUIT-CLAIM DEED 
Leon H. Saunders, as to an undivided Twenty-Five Percent Interest. 
of Salt Late City , County of Salt Lake 
QUIT-CLAIM to Saunders Land Investment Corp. 
grantor 
, State of Utah, hereby 
of Salt Lake City, Utah 
***Tten*** 
the following described tract of land in Suwnit 
Sure of Utah: 
grantee 
for the sum of 
DOLLARS, 
County, 
ALL CF LOT 3 , WHITE PINE RANCHES PHASE I , A PLANNED RESIDENTIAL DEVELOPMENT, 
ACCORDING TO THE OFFICIAL PLAT THEREOF CN FILE AND OF RECORD IN THE SUWHT 
COUNTY RECORDER'S OFFICE. 
VITNESS the hand oi said grantor , this 5Wl _. ^ _. 
February , A. D. one thousand nine bnndred and E l ^ t y Five 
Signed in the presence of 
h dwo* 33Qreft467 
My a expires 
day of 
STATE OF UTAH, 
County of Salt Lake 
On the 5th day of February A. D. one 
thousand nine hundred and Eighty Five personally appeared before me 
Leon H. Saunders ^ T ? 5 X 
the signer of the foregoing instrument, who duly acki£ujejgqiaj0&e tQ% %he executed the 
same, | o / PUBLIC \ « g f ' / / ' ' ? ^ 
\ v jNbtMT Public 
ILANK MO. |S)t- e •'••"•• =o"-""" *• »«• t w w e r o M w w r 
SUt OF * V SmJUL^ 
34 
Recorded at Request o f „ i 2 2 J ^ L I ! ! L ^ ^ L a J l i C l t ^' Ut 8 4 1 0 8 
at M. Fee Paid $ .. . . _ 
by „ Dep. Book ........ Page_..... . Ref.: .„ 
Mail tax notice to...^.:£^XX^J£ . Addre* J ^ \ C L 1 - J ? e i ^ . £ ^ / v^_ 
QUIT-CLAIM DEED 
Leon H. Saunders, as to an undivided Twenty-Five Percent Interest. 
grantor 
of Salt Lake City , County of Salt Lake , State of Utah, hereby 
QUIT-CLAIM to J. Richard " 
grantee 
of Ogden, Utah for the sum of 
***Ten*** DOLLARS, 
the following described tract of land in Sunmit County, 
Sate of Utah: 
ALL CF LOT 4 , WHITE PINE RANCHES PHASE I , A PLANNED RESIDEOTIAL DEVELOPMENT, 
ACCORDING TO TOE OFFICIAL PLAT TOERECF ON FILE AND CF RECORD IN THE SUMMIT 
COUNT* RECORDER'S OFFICE. 
T^Tto 231091 ^*m~~**>l. I--— 
ASSOCIATED TfTLE CQJ REQUEST OF 
FEE tUm SWWGS. SUMMIT CO R£CO*0£B J 
RECORDED -*-<* 0 - # S
 at /* :^>#. M 
VITNESS the hand of said grantor , this 5th day of 
February , A* D. one thousand nine hundred and Ei9hty five 
Signed in the presence of ) J^X£+ZLJ£ .-_> QJAMA&2^~^ 
*$$*---m*762 
STATE OF UTAH, 
County of Salt Lake 
On the 5th day*f February
 A . D . ^ 
thousand nine hundred and Elghty c l ve personally appeared before me 
Leon H. Saunders 
the signer of the foregoing instrument, who duly acknowledge tojht^thy^^hcJ ^^xecuted the 
v sept i a^W"yy rwiuc-
My com minion expires Address: ^ ifyS^^^S^ 
NO IOS«^ O 0 1 * *TO CO — S f * #0 1«00 MX _«- «*kT ULKS ClTT ''/fy *£ Q f V .^\V 
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Recorded at Request of £SSi!LLlLIt!!l£^ 
at M. Fee Paid $ 
by ^ Dep. Book Page Ref.: 
Mail tax notice t o i ^ X x - S I t C Address ..3^lC-.X---\rJv^.-A\.\i ^ 
QUIT-CLAIM DEED 
Saunders Land Investment Corp. as to an undivided Twenty-Five Percent Interest 
. grantor 
of S a l t Lake City , County of Sa l t Lake
 t State of Utah, hereby 
QUIT-CLAIM to J . Richard Rees 
of Ogden, Utah 
***Ten** 
the following described tract of land in Smmit 
State of Utah: 
grantee 
for the sum of 
DOLLARS. 
County, 
ALL OF LOT 4, V«TTE PINE RANCHES PHASE I , A PLANNED RESIDENTIAL DEVELOPMENT, 
ACCORDING TO THE OFFICIAL PLAT THEREOF CN FILE AND OF RECORD IN THE SltftUT 
COUNTY RECORDER'S OFFICE. 
WITNESS the hand of said grantor , this 
February , A. D. one thousand 
Signed in the presence of 
5th day of 
hundred and Eighty Five 
332fA„763 
STATE OF UTAH, 
County of Salt Lake 
On the 5th A. D. one day of February 
thousand nine hundred and E i Qhty F i ve personally appeared before me 
Leon H. Saunders, President of Saunders Lard Investment Goro. 
the signer of the foregoing instrument, who duly acknowledtt^in>4hs^s/^L% executed the" 
„ stpiTi^ j i^fotaij Public 
My commission expires A*M#»M. \ ^ X y $ tw-kAA MJtMK~NO.~IOS— O «CM>ra. co — JII* »o I M P SAST — «AUT LAHM, CITT 
36 
Recorded at Request of 
at. M. Fee Paid J „ 
by Dep. Book Page Ref.: 
MaU tax notice t a O & X O E s S C , . A d d i m - 3 A C C L l 3 « A \ C . &U& 
QUIT-CLAIM DEED 
Robert Felton, as to an undivided Iwenty-Five Percent Interest. 
of Salt I*ke City , County of Salt Lake Sttte of Utah 1 ? ^ 
QUIT-CLAIM to J. Richard Rees ' *UU ot U a h » **** 
of Ogden, Utah 
the following described tract of land in 
State of Utah: 
***len*** 
Sumdt 
grantee 
foe the mm o£ 
DOLLARS, 
County, 
ALL OF LOT 4, WHITE PINE RANCHES PHASE I, A PLANNH5 RESIDENTIAL DEVELOPMENT, 
ACCORDING TO IHE OFFICIAL PLAT 1HERBCF CN FILE AND OF RECORD IN IHE SUMHIT 
QO®m RECORDER'S OFFICE. 
'entry ?4o 
r • -
231093 
•QUEST OF ASSOCIATED TITLE CQ. 
J* S » * K X * SUMMIT CO. « € C C M C S R • 
9y Mfftf'*i*t</.<$!& *5lajL, %2&2*f**' 
j « CORDED 2 V ?• f 5 it /^ : 3V^ , M 
WITNESS the hand of said grantor , this [TNESS tne nana ot saia grantor , tnss ' J> / 
]Ljl?f>'«y , A. D. one thousand nine hundttd and f </£&« 
Signed in the presence of 
day of 
&y of A. D. one 
personally appeared before me 
STATE 0 F 4 J T * H , \ 
dioosandjiiAcliundrWVjiiTb , 
: thettsner of the^ore'|oing instrument, who duly acknowledge to me that he executed the 
'. same/ <j u L ! t : i . i . - , j 
J ^-/t *-
^ • x 
^ V ' j - Addrew 
Notary Public. 
>\~~; 'U 
fssi#r-iscf am gwv 
Recorded at Request of 
at M. Fee Paid $ . 
by Dep. Book Page Ref . 
Mall tax notice t o *TW>gu^ G w » W Address c,J vVt »S>Vb C L X • Vv\. 
WARRAJTY DEED 
WHITE PINE RANCHES, a Utah general partnership comprised of 
Leon H. Saunders, Saunders Land Investment Corp., Robert Felton 
and J. Richard Reeae hereby conveys and varranta to Robert 
Felton, Grantee, of Salt Lake City, State of Utah, for the sum of 
Ten Dollars ($10.00) the following described tract of land in 
Summit County, State of Utah; 
Seventy-Five Percent (75Z) undivided interest 
in and to Lot 6, White Pine Ranches, Phase I 
as recorded in the office of the County 
Recorder of Summit County, State of Utah. 
Excepting therefro 
Lot 6 and subject 
Leon H. Saunders f 
well site located 
maintain, repair a 
the well located on said 
to an eaaement in favor of 
or egress and ingress to th< 
on Lot 6 and for access to 
nd use said aite. 
1986. 
WITNESS, the hand of the Grantor, thi . r/_d. y of March, 
Entry No. 250225 
REQUEST OF \ A v f t ^ N* 
FEE _, SC*lAN$j 
S - - - — 
RECORDED 
SUMMIT CO. PfOCRCE D R 
WHITE PI 
By: 
Robert Felton, General Partner 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On the /*/ day of Marc 
Felton, a General Partner i 
Ranches who by me being fir 
executed this Deed for and 
General Partner of the Partnership 
h, 1986 appeared before me Robert 
n the Partnership of White Plae 
st duly sworn did state that he 
on behalf of the Partnership and as a 
^ ^ f t a ^ CUn*Ui A 
Notary Public1 
Residing at: 
*t*&^ 
,£W'" A»3fr,fr/ 
Myf Commission g x p i ' r e s : 
1 »*;?....-. i AC" ".--. 
bOO' 382P«*537 
38 
SUMMARY OF RELEASES DUE 
Lot 1-3 and Road 
Lot 4 
Lot 5 
Lot 6 
5.35 acres 
2.00 acres 
Payment Date 
July 16, 1981 
June 30, 1982 
November 14, 1983 
June 30, 1984 
June 30, 1984 
June 30, 1985 
Release 
Due Date 
December 23, 1983 
December 23, 1983 
December 23, 1983 
June 30, 1984 
June 30, 1984 
June 30, 1985 
PLAINTIFFS 
I EXHIBIT 
j& 
